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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we evaluate the institutional and legal structure of the Colombian government. In particular, we 
want to assess how a system of institutional checks and balances can be structured to promote the rule of law, 
preserve property rights, and stimulate economic growth. The 1991 Constitution indeed makes commendable 
commitments to these objectives. Yet, due to its institutional structure, Colombia is governed in a manner that is 
both unchecked and unbalanced. The Constitutional Assembly tried to put into the basic law of the land a 
welfare state that emulates those of Canada and Sweden. But, neither of these countries has deemed it necessary 
to guarantee such policy outcome through constitutional provisions. In contrast, the Colombian Constitution is 
an enormously long document that attempts to reassure all parties that the future will be to their liking. For 
example, Article 58, which permits uncompensated expropriation for reasons of “equity”, might be a substantial 
deterrent to investment. Our examination of the Constitution of 1991 sounds a warning about the current peace 
process. The nation’s long run economic health may be seriously impaired if peace is bought at the price of 
widespread concessions with regard to either the process of decision-making about the economy or to the 
specific content of future government economic policies. One may buy transitory tranquility, which may not 
translate in to lasting peace, at the price of long-term instability and turmoil. The implied trade-off may be most 
undesirable. We make recommendations for institutional reform, which aim to mitigate clientelist and populist 
trends in Colombian politics. An overall smaller congress is suggested. To enhance policymaking by reducing the 
scope for gridlock, we propose measures such as long-term appointments and ballot accountability that eliminate 
distortions to the voting incentives of both judges and lawmakers. Also, we advocate the promotion of citizen 
rights to initiate referenda, of courts specialized on economic matters, and of executive agenda setting powers 
through fast-track legislation. Finally, procedures are set forth to limit undue deliberations by the judiciary and to 
induce institutional status-quo bias. While we support constitutional provisions for the stability of a political 
process endowed with representativeness, we reject constitutional provisions that attempt to entrench one 
particular policy outcome. Stationary policy is likely to be both suboptimal and unsustainable in a stochastic and 
dynamic environment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we evaluate the institutional and legal structure of the Colombian 
government. In particular, we want to assess how a system of institutional checks and 
balances can be structured to promote the rule of law, preserve property rights, and 
stimulate economic growth. The institutional structure must acquire widespread popular 
legitimacy and be conducive to widespread human capital formation and participation in 
the benefits of growth to be sustainable in the long run.  To further these objectives, we 
suggest the policy recommendations set forth in the Appendix. On the basis of the analysis 
below, we point out how the proposed reforms address the institutional weaknesses 
identified. 
 
The 1991 Constitution indeed makes commendable commitments to promote 
institutions conducive to achieve equity and prosperity. Yet, due to its constitutional 
structure, Colombia is governed in a manner that is both unchecked and unbalanced.  Here 
are some examples: 
 
•  Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution of 1991 commit the central government to 
a rigid schedule of increasing redistribution of tax revenues to regional 
governments.  This schedule cannot, in principle, be checked by events —the 
functions of national defence and internal security may require the central 
government to have a higher share of revenues in a recession— or experience —
functions with cross-departmental externalities, such as environmental regulation, 
might be better pursued by the central government.  At the same time, the 
Constitution does not provide for balances that lead the departmental governments 
to fiscal responsibility in either the national or regional budget allocations. The 
departmental governments can run fiscal deficits with the expectation of a bailout 
by the central government.   
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•  The Constitution, partly out of an unbalanced commitment to equality of results 
rather than equality of opportunities, has permitted the Constitutional Court to act 
in an activist manner in which it regularly overturns legislation passed with the 
assent of the President and the Congress.  For example, the Court has blocked the 
deindexation of wages for public employees simply because pensions were indexed 
(by Article 53 of the Constitution).  The Constitutional Court has also ruled against 
the government’s policies relating to reform of bureaucracy,
2 to the structure of 
interest payments on mortgages, and to differential taxes on consumer banking vs. 
inter-bank transactions.
3 In all cases the rulings can be deemed to have caused 
significant macroeconomic damage.  More generally, the Court has gone beyond 
the normal check known as “judicial review” by overturning the Government’s 
Development Plan and has largely usurped the normal executive and legislative 
direction of economic policy . 
 
•  The Constitution gives private individuals standing to contest legislation directly 
with the highest courts in the land.  As a result, almost all legislation is contested.  
The Constitutional Court is free to pick and choose among the complaints.  Often, 
legislation is overturned on narrow procedural grounds.  The Court and the 
legislature are not evenly balanced because in part details of the internal 
organization of the legislature—such as requirements for debate— are incorporated 
into the Constitution.  In contrast to most other nations, where internal 
organization is left to the discretion of the legislature, the inclusion of details in the 
Colombian Constitution about how laws are passed has in fact contributed to 
extraordinary intervention by the Court. It has become difficult for the government 
to anticipate which legislative acts will be sustained. 
 
The Constitution of 1991 was partly negotiated as a means of ending internal strife.  
The former revolutionary group M-19, which turned into a populist party with overarching 
redistributive goals, had a major success in the popular elections for the Constitutional 
Assembly and received a big seat at the table. In fact, their party, Alianza Popular, had the 
                                                            
2   The reform was designed to reduce the size of the public sector and thereby mitigate rent-seeking as well as capture.  
3  Taxation on inter-bank transactions can induce a liquidity crunch, as friction in the system of payments halts the 
smooth flow of money in the economy, and financial repression can retard growth (see e.g. Kugler and Neusser, 1998).  Checks & Balances  Page 4  09/09/00 
highest proportion of delegates compared to any of the competing lists emanating from the 
fragmented traditional political parties. The result was an enormously long document that 
attempted to reassure all sides that the future would be to their liking by introducing article 
after article with explicit provisions for all, followed by a general disclaimer of possible 
inapplicability in extenuating circumstances.
4 The Constitution attempts to be a document 
of rigid micromanagement (such as mandating indexation of pensions, setting targets for 
inflation and the allocation of regional public expenditures) rather than one that establishes 
basic institutions for democratic decision-making in a dynamic world.  Moreover, written at 
the time when many nations in the world were emerging from state socialism and moving 
to market capitalism, the Constitution commits and creates expectations of a welfare state. 
In fact, such emphasis runs orthogonal to the market-oriented economic reforms 
introduced the same year by the Government.  
 
Specifically, chapter II, Article I, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” creates 
unfeasible expectations for subgroups in the society such as the handicapped, children, and 
senior citizens. But, the Colombian Government cannot, at present, possibly be expected 
to emulate its Swedish or Canadian counterparts.  In contrast, such text is not found in the 
Canadian Constitution.
5  Meanwhile, the US Constitution asserts only that it seeks to 
“promote the general welfare”.  Worse, an overemphasis on unfettered egalitarianism can 
lead to widespread misery.  For example, Article 58, which permits uncompensated 
                                                            
4  This is an extreme manifestation of a general trend. Mueller (1996) reports that newly drafted constitutions 
in recent years have not resulted in the governmental structure and rule of the game best suited to yield long-
term welfare but rather have been geared to satisfy the short-term interests of the politicians who controlled 
the constitutional conventions. This is consistent with the findings by Shuggart (1998), who models political 
transition and finds that reform will result in an equilibrium favouring the constituencies of incumbents. 
5  The most that the Canadian Constitution has is a provision allowing for affirmative action programs under 
certain circumstances (see article 15, Constitution Act, 1982, below). The Colombian Constitution tries to 
“constitutionalize” or put into the basic law of the land a welfare state system that emulates that of Canada or 
Sweden.  Yet, neither of these countries has deemed it necessary to put such rules into the constitution of 
their countries.  On the general powers of the federal parliament, see article 91, Constitution Act 1867, 
concerning the powers of the federal legislature: “91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good 
Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act 
assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.”   
 
(N.B., See also Constitution Act, 1982: 15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the 
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability. (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the 
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged 
because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.)  Checks & Balances  Page 5  09/09/00 
expropriation for reasons of “equity”, might be a substantial deterrent to investment and 
economic growth. 
  
Our examination of the Constitution of 1991 sounds a warning about the current peace 
process.  The nation’s long run economic health may be seriously impaired if peace is 
bought at the price of widespread concessions with regard to either the process of 
decision-making about the economy or to the content of future government economic 
policies. One may buy transitory tranquillity, which may not translate in to lasting peace, at 
the price of long-term instability and turmoil. The implied trade-off may be most 
undesirable. 
 
In section 2 of the chapter, we provide a discussion of the theory about how 
government can be structured to provide checks and balances and of the practical issues 
involving the implementation of institutional reform in Colombia.  Then, in section 3, we 
discuss the major problems of Colombia and how our policy recommendations are 
designed to meet these problems.  Next, Section 4 explores the issue of institutional 
instability and in particular the nature of the executive-legislative relation.  Section 5 follows 
up with an assessment of the balance of powers among the three branches of government 
and the operation of institutional checks.  After that Section 6 deals with the problem of 
concentration of power and the implications for the electoral system, while Section 7 closes 
with conclusions and ponders further issues. 
 
2. The Advantages of Checks and Balances 
 
Democracy can lead, as de Tocqueville noted in Democracy in America, to a “tyranny of the 
majority” in which minority rights and preferences are given short shrift.  For example, 
citizens can have short-run perspectives and use majority rule for redistribution.  Too 
much redistribution can not only harm some individuals in the short run but also seriously 
affect the incentives necessary to promote long run growth.  Moreover, in any political 
system, self-interested politicians will seek to extract rents.  That is, any political system can 
offer plenty of opportunity for corruption.  This is particularly present in Colombia where 
politics has traditionally been organized along clientelist lines, where the loyalties of Checks & Balances  Page 6  09/09/00 
politicians are to narrow interest groups, such as teachers’ unions or localities, rather than 
being organized into broad coalitions formed around “ideological” parties.
6 Institutional 
checks and balances can be instrumental in minimizing the scope for opportunism in 
political decision-making. In this section we discuss the theory behind the separation of 
powers as well as some crucial general considerations about the implementation of 
institutional reform in Colombia.  
 
2.1 The Theory about the Separation of Powers 
 
The doctrine of the separation of powers is a basic principle within the liberal 
constitutionalist tradition. Some political philosophers have enshrined the separation of 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers as an important institution in order to prevent the 
abuse of political power by office holders.
7 While elections are a disciplining device, various 
political systems have different degrees of balance of power among the citizenry and the 
branches of government. The general presumption is that the separation of powers gives 
voters in liberal democracies a greater degree of control to discipline elected officials. If 
there is competition by division of powers among government agencies, say along 
geographical lines, agents can not only voice their opinion in the next elections but also 
exercise an exit option should they be dissatisfied.
8  
 
Recent political economy literature has assessed the impact of the separation of 
powers on the well being of citizens. Some have taken a sceptical stance with respect to the 
presumption that the separation of powers is an optimal arrangement. Brennan and Hamlin 
                                                            
6  A salient problem is where to draw the line between clientelist systems and interest group politics.  On the 
one hand, interest group politics occurs in a framework of organized competition among many effective 
interest groups, thereby resulting in politicians’ representation of varied interests. And, where extra-legal 
means are used, existing political institutions check such extra-legal means.  On the other hand, clientelist 
politics is marked by politicians’ expression of a limited number of interests based upon legal and extra-legal 
means of influence, and without checks or balances. 
 
7  To see the limits of this doctrine consider that the UK is a successful democracy without separation of 
powers between the executive and the legislative, or without a formal Constitution for that matter. The 
Magna Carta is not a declaration that fully specifies the political system. On the other hand, separation of 
powers makes more sense in the United States largely because of the federal system. The legislature provides 
regional interests with a vehicle for checking the executive. The same seems warranted in Colombia, but it 
may have been overemphasized in the Constitution. 
8  Brennan and Hamlin (2000) use these two modes of response emphasized by Hirshman (1970) to analyse 
the separation of powers. Checks & Balances  Page 7  09/09/00 
(1994, 2000) argue that in some instances the separation of powers may be detrimental in 
that a common pool problem may be induced leading to negative externalities between 
various branches or hierarchies of the State. Hence, checks and balances may cause a 
failure by the government to deliver to the citizens due to distributional conflict. Chari, 
Jones and Marimon (1997) explore this theme further by analysing split-ticket voting for 
federal and regional political representatives, in a static model with endogenous policy 
formation. In general, separation of the executive and the legislature may not guarantee an 
optimal outcome.  
 
Alesina and Rosenthal (1996, 2000) show in a dynamic framework that 
bicameralism, federalism, presidentialism and other forms of separation of powers are 
beneficial as voters have more possible choices spanning the political spectrum. The voters 
can thereby obtain moderate policies even when the political parties are polarized. Also 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997a, 1997b) show that the separation of powers 
eliminates political rents accruing from information asymmetry and abuse of power. It is 
implicit that the judiciary will enforce that the bargaining process between the executive 
and the legislature is within the rules of the game. In both cases, it is assumed that an 
independent and benevolent judiciary is capable of enforcing the constitutional rules, which 
provide checks through mutual agreement requirements and balances by distributing 
agenda control. 
 
The assumption that the judiciary will perform its function without distortions is 
one that may not be appropriate in general, and especially with reference to the Colombian 
case. One of the main contributions of modern political economy has been the 
introduction of strategic behaviour by politicians. Here we explore also the consequences 
of strategic behaviour by judges, who may be politically and economically motivated.  A 
politically and economically motivated judiciary could result in a bad form of policy 
gridlock.
9  Gridlock can occur even when the judiciary does not intervene, but it will 
generally occur when there is not a large popular majority for policy change (Krehbiel, 
1998).  A particularly worrisome outcome would be where a very unrepresentative judiciary 
blocks policy change that has been approved by the executive and legislative branch and Checks & Balances  Page 8  09/09/00 
has widespread popular consensus. Similar motivations could further reduce checks and 
balances by leading to a court with a weak enforcement capacity in ordinary cases.   
 
2.2 General Considerations 
 
While the theory seems to favour the separation of powers, especially in presidential 
systems such as the Colombian, there is a risk of pervasive stalemate if political influence is 
based on the power to veto rather than to legislate. In this section, we list and discuss 
issues about the implementation of reforms to institutional checks and balances particularly 
relevant to Colombia.   
 
2.2.1 Constitutional vs. Civil Courts 
 
Whereas it has been noted that judicial power in constitutional matters has increased, 
courts ruling on administrative and criminal matters remain weak and impunity is rampant.  
Indeed, this is a worst case scenario where courts fail at their basic functions of enforcing 
human rights and property rights but intervene at the highest level of policymaking. 
 
However, having a strong Constitutional Court may have positive effects since a 
judiciary weak in constitutional matters could leave the door open for covert collusion 
between the executive and the legislature.  The problem is when the court decisions are 
beyond the realm of ruling about the legality of the dealings of governmental agencies and 
impinge more directly on the viability of policy implementation.
10  
2.2.2 How Much Change is Needed? 
 
Clearly, there is need for change in the political system of Colombia in order to reduce 
pressures for short run redistribution, corruption, and clientelism. A central question 
concerns the extent of change required.  It is doubtful that solely incremental change 
within the current system can achieve the desired goals. On the contrary, it is likely that 
fundamentally different institutions are required to attain political stability and economic 
prosperity.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
9  Spiller (1990) and Gely and Spiller (1992) model how judges engage in strategic behaviour, when they are 
politically and economically motivated.  
10  Hartlyn (1988, 1994) discusses collusion as an aspect of political coalitions in Colombia. Checks & Balances  Page 9  09/09/00 
 
A closely related question concerns whether the changes can be limited to the 
formal governmental structure. Change in executive-legislative relations and in the structure 
of courts cannot be meaningful without addressing the fact that Colombia is faced with 
very significant extra-legal activity. In particular, those segments of Colombian society that 
have identified with the insurgent political groups, both left-wing and paramilitary, must be 
included in the democratic process in order to achieve long-term stability. Also, we must 
consider the fact that the extensive extra-legal activity itself could be related to distributive 
conflicts stemming from limits to meritocracy. Barriers to entry in society are perpetuated 
by how clientelist interests shape political outcomes and are claimed by some to be at the 
heart of the origins of political violence. 
 
2.2.3 There is No One “Best Way” 
 
We approach our task with a large measure of humility.  Numerous nations have by now 
attained a high level of economic development and a relatively high level of personal 
freedom and physical security for their citizens. The institutions of government vary widely 
across these nations.  In some, only recently have the executive and legislative branches of 
government been “checked” by an independent judiciary.  In many, cabinet government 
prevails; and individual legislators are allowed little initiative in the policy process.  In 
others, legislative dominance has been asserted. Similarly, there is variation in the 
independence of central banks and other agencies of economic regulation.
11 
 
These observations suggest there is unlikely to be “one best way.” Even for a given 
country, if there were “a best way”, feasible change is highly path-dependent. For example, 
the presumption that the separation of powers in government is the best way to achieve 
political accountability relies on the enforcement capacity and impartiality of the judicial 
branch. Then, only once constitutional provisions endowing the judiciary with appropriate 
incentives are guaranteed, can we expect checks and balances among the branches of 
government. But, many institutions designed to provide a check fail to work in the manner 
                                                            
11 For example, there are dramatic differences in bankruptcy law and procedures in the UK and the US, even 
though these countries have relatively similar legal traditions and both are electoral democracies.  See Franks 
and Sussman (1998). Checks & Balances  Page 10  09/09/00 
intended.
12 Furthermore, sometimes the political environment changes in unexpected 
ways.
13 
 
2.2.4 Governmental Institutions and Separation of Powers 
 
Checks and balances institutions that address the problems induced by simple majority 
voting include executive vetoes, bicameral legislatures, requirements for supermajority 
votes in some areas, and judicial review.  All of these institutions induce bias toward 
maintaining the status quo over that found in majority rule.  These institutions can also be 
used to design incentive systems that improve the accountability of politicians.   
 
In general, if electoral control is imperfect, mutual agreement requirements and the 
agenda setting structure may be used to mitigate the concentration of political power.  For 
example, accountability might be improved by allowing one set of political actors to decide 
on the size of a budget, or level of taxation, and another to decide on how the budget is to 
be allocated across programs.
14  
 
In practice, the separation of powers needs to be complemented by a division of 
powers. The latter establishes the distribution of political power among government 
agencies above and beyond the allocation of functions between the various branches of 
government furnished by the separation of powers.
15 The institutional framework furnished 
by the Constitution must be conducive to even checks and balances between the President, 
                                                            
12 Here are two examples. 
A.  The constitution of the French Fifth Republic provided for indirect election of the President of the Republic.  
The intent of the framers, principally Michel Debré, was to provide a conservative bias to the procedure.  In 
fact, the members of the Electoral College had a conservative bias but were anti-Gaullist.  Provision for direct 
election was made in 1962 through a referendum that amended the constitution. 
 
B.    The bicameral US system was designed so that an indirectly elected Senate would balance a popularly elected 
House of Representatives.  The House was to be elected every two years; the framers believed it would be too 
sensitive to swings in public opinion.  The Senate was indirectly elected with staggered 6-year terms.  Each state 
had two senators.  This feature allowed the small states to “balance” the representation of the large states in the 
House.  Indirect election was finally abolished in 1912.  The framers had failed to anticipate a process of 
democratisation, which included first removal of property restrictions on voting and later removal of racial and 
gender restrictions.  
13 In fact, constituency service and other features of the modern political system (see e.g. Fiorina, 1989) 
provide House incumbents with a virtual lock on re-election.  In contrast, Senate seats are less safe.  The 
apparent explanation for the greater volatility of Senate seats is that senators run in statewide constituencies, 
making television marketing more cost-effective.  It is easier for challengers to become visible and get their 
message across.  We have applied this insight to our proposal to reduce the size of the Senate. 
14 See Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997a). 
15 See Brennan and Hamlin (2000). Checks & Balances  Page 11  09/09/00 
Congress and the courts. If one of the functional branches of government has excessive 
prerogatives to rule over decision-making by the others, the separation of powers will not 
suffice to endow policymaking with representativeness of the electorate’s general interests.  
 
2.2.5 Electoral Institutions and Political Parties 
 
Accountability is also impaired by clientelist politics.  Healthy political systems in Europe, 
North America, Australia, and New Zealand aggregate these interests not directly in the 
legislature but first in broad-based parties that are coalitions of interests.  The legislative 
goals of these parties then represent packages of national policies.  The parties become 
effective advocates for the interests of large groups in the public. At the same time, the 
institutional framework effectively checks extra-legal activity related to interest-group 
activity. 
 
A cost of a party system is that the parties tend to become advocates for relatively 
extreme interests.  In the United Kingdom and the United States, Labour and the 
Democrats, respectively, can be seen as advocating policies biased to worker interests 
whereas the Tories and Republicans, respectively, are too favourable to capital.  But checks 
and balances can be and have been incorporated in the electoral system that allow voters to 
obtain more moderate compromises by creating divided government or by signalling, in by-
elections, disapproval of current government policy.  Such opportunities appear to be 
effectively used in the United States
16, France
17, Canada
18, and Germany
19.   
 
Colombia itself currently has divided government with a Conservative president 
and a Liberal Congress.  The problem is that the two parties have failed to articulate the 
interests of broader publics by aggregating constituencies to thereby align policy. Coalitions 
can be built on the basis of clientelist deals and political influence is garnered from the 
destructive threat of gridlock rather than the constructive potential of forward-looking 
policymaking.  
                                                            
16 See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), Scheve and Tomz (1999), and Mebane (2000). 
17 See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). 
18 See Erikson and Filippov (1998). 
19 See Brady, Cogan and Rivers (1997). Checks & Balances  Page 12  09/09/00 
2.2.6 Referenda and Initiative 
 
When either legislative accountability or legislative responsiveness is weak, it may be 
desirable to counterbalance representative democracy with elements of direct democracy. 
The advantage of referenda is that the executive or legislature can leave difficult decisions 
to the public and that the result, having been decided by the public, will have greater 
legitimacy than a legislative action.  The disadvantage is in the opportunity to frame the 
proposal in a manipulative manner. Initiatives are direct popular proposals.  The advantage 
is that they enable majorities to go “over the head” of legislatures.  A disadvantage is 
represented by our earlier critique of the “tyranny of the majority”.  Making it relatively 
costly—in terms of required signatures, for example—to place an initiative on the ballot 
can mitigate this disadvantage. 
 
3.  Colombia’s Problems and Proposals for Institutional Change 
 
In this section, we list the main problems of the Colombian political system and discuss 
how our proposals aim to deal with them. We focus on the related issues of absence of 
transparency due to misgovernance and the lack of political representativeness of the State. 
 
3.1 Blurred Transparency  
 
The extent of the problem of misgovernance and the limited transparency observed is 
exemplified by how policymaking is affected by the following two facts: 
 
1.  There is an absence of physical security produced by a high degree of criminal 
activity throughout the society, in general, and armed guerrilla and paramilitary 
units, in particular, in much of the national territory. Impunity is rampant as both 
law enforcement bodies and courts are unable to cope with their respective 
functions. Crime prevention and punishment have gradually shifted from the 
appropriate governmental agencies into the private sphere.  
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2.  Traditionally, there has been limited civilian control of the military. The absence of 
military intervention in recent years may result on the one hand from the military’s 
ability to obtain relatively large budgets as a result of the twin problems of physical 
insecurity and political violence and, paradoxically, to possibly benefit indirectly 
from narco-trafficking.  Thus, the military may not have sufficiently strong 
incentives to deal with these problems. 
 
Tackling these first two essential issues is outside the scope of this chapter.  We do 
note, however, that these problems have had an undeniable impact on institutional 
performance.  For example, the Congress has adopted secret voting in response to physical 
threats to its members.  Secret voting also appears to be present in the high courts, where 
the results of the decisions, but not the votes of the individual judges, are disclosed to the 
public. Secret voting removes the transparency of political decision-making by reducing 
accountability of the legislature and the judiciary.  It enables the political actor to engage in 
ex post credit claiming for decisions that turn out to be popular but to avoid responsibility 
for unpopular actions.  Since judges as well as legislators have limited term appointments in 
Colombia, the courts as well as the legislature are faced with similar incentive problems 
posed by secret voting.  With the exception of Latin America, secret voting is rare in 
democratic national legislatures.  Where it does appear, as in Italy, it appears to be related 
to government corruption and instability.  Our proposal is to eliminate secret voting in 
areas that do not pose problems of physical insecurity. 
 
3.2 Unrepresentative Politics 
 
The limitations in the representativeness of policymaking and how distortions result from 
court activism can be gleaned from the observations below: 
 
3.  The Colombian elite is relatively narrowly based.  For example, there appears to be 
a strong element of family heredity in the presidency (e.g. three pairs of close 
relatives who were presidents: two Pastrana's, two Lopez’s, two Lleras's).  The top 
levels of the government have a strong technocratic element.  At the same time, as 
stated by the Economist Intelligence Unit, “ideological differences between the parties Checks & Balances  Page 14  09/09/00 
have all but vanished as both now support economic liberalism and some degree of 
federalism.”  In this situation, there is clearly a need for change such that the 
Congress can better represent the mass public. 
 
4.  At present, Congress is clientelist in its orientation.  As a result, it tends to impose 
“pork barrel” politics where policies are inefficient and rents are distributed to 
special interests.  Executive proposals to improve efficiency and promote growth 
are either rejected outright or modified to promote inefficient redistribution.   
Alternatively, the executive is forced to make pork barrel concessions to members 
of the legislature.  The executive has only weak countervailing power with respect 
to the legislature.  It can challenge the constitutionality of passed laws through the 
Constitutional Court but it cannot veto laws on the basis of their content going 
against national interest. This reduces the scope for the executive to mitigate the 
attachment of special interest clauses to general laws.  To overcome this limitation, 
our sixth proposal provides agenda setting powers to the executive by making 
possible the passage of urgent legislation through a fast-track procedure without 
modifications.  The electoral reform proposal
20 of changing largest remainder for 
proportional representation and our proposals 7, 8, and 9 are also designed to 
attack the problem of clientelism.  In addition, proposal 10 for popular initiative is 
designed to promote citizen action when the legislature is highly unresponsive. 
 
Even when the executive and legislature agree on legislation, the legislation is often struck 
down by the judicial branch.  Unwarranted judicial activism is produced, in part, by the 
overly egalitarian expectations created by the Constitution and, in part, by the tendency to 
populism in the judiciary throughout Latin America.
21   
 
Institutionally, activism is promoted by the absence of structure within the judicial 
system.  Our first proposal attacks this problem. Our second proposal, for supermajority 
decisions deals with activism directly. In other words, the executive and legislature are 
“innocent until proven guilty”. Analogous to jury trials, where unanimity is required to 
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convict, supermajorities of judges would be needed to overrule legislation. Our third 
proposal, for life tenure, reduces the political incentives to populism. At present, judges 
serve eight-year terms and cannot be reappointed.  
 
Moreover, our fourth proposal is that the executive and the legislature appoint 
judges in the highest courts to eliminate pressures for populism induced by self-
recruitment in the judiciary. This would also eliminate the need for the prohibition of 
holding another high court judgeship within one year of appointment to the constitutional 
court. Our fifth proposal advocates the introduction of specialized courts for economic 
matters within the hierarchy of the judiciary. 
 
4.  Institutional Instability and Executive-Legislative Relations 
 
In this section we explore the roots of institutional instability and consider how the 
relationship among the president and congress have been affected. In its short history, a 
very wide range of institutional structures has been implemented in Colombia. Since 
independence in 1810, there have been drastic constitutional changes in 1821, 1848, 1863, 
1886, 1910, and 1991. Beyond the Constitutional Assembly of 1991, recently the 
constitution underwent other important modifications, as in the Constitutional Reform of 
1936 or Article 120 in 1968.   
 
  Also, important variations have occurred in the degree of concentration of 
political power. There have been periods of two-party consensus, as in the National Front, 
as well as winner take all arrangements, with widespread redistribution of political control 
from the losing party to the winning party. Moreover, there were periods of military rule 
and also one-party dominance, as in the Liberal eras from 1930 to La Violencia and a 
military dictatorship in 1958.  
 
  Within all these variations of the allocation of power, little has been done to 
foster and strengthen grass roots democracy. There are institutional barriers to 
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democratisation, such as the ban on military service for anyone with a high school diploma. 
While military rule is obviously undemocratic, even the periods of consensus have largely 
concerned power sharing within narrow groups and the absence of social mobility into the 
governmental leadership.  
 
4.1 The Roots of Instability 
 
We observe that the Executive has since 1948 enjoyed great discretion and repeatedly 
bypassed the formal system of checks and balances, by assuming special powers during 
states of emergency.
22 One possible explanation would be that political elites have 
attempted necessary institutional reform but have been stymied by either localism or 
Liberal party dominance in the Congress, suggesting instability in coalition formation 
within the legislature that has led to executive exercise of discretion. However, the most 
common justification given historically for the declaration of states of emergency by the 
President has been to restore the rule of law and order in the wake outbursts of violence, 
rather than to override Congress. 
 
Endemic violence has perpetuated to the point that its use as a political and 
economic asset in contemporary Colombia provides strong incentives for some groups to 
exit from the established democratic process. Hence, the salient features in this 
environment of institutional instability have been both the concentration of political power 
and the persistence of political violence.  
 
The suspension of normal functioning of the judicial and legislative branches of 
government dictated by the frequent declaration of states of emergency has implied ample 
discretion for the executive branch and the military to exercise political control. During 
emergency periods, politics were run in an extremely centralized fashion with neither 
checks nor balances. Over time substantial increases in the defence budget were justified 
on the grounds of a situation nearing civil war.  
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While the threat of a rebel takeover has never been imminent, interestingly, the 
extermination of political violence has not become a likely outcome at any stage of the 
conflict.  The persistence of political violence was a sustainable equilibrium until the last 
decade, before the alliance of the guerrillas with drug cartels raised the stakes.  The end of 
the guerrilla movement would have eliminated the scope for the declaration of states of 
emergency and thereby would have deprived the executive of the benefits of the 
concentration of political power, and the military would have lost substantial resources. 
This is yet another example of how an institution designed to provide checks and balances, 
namely the declaration of states of emergency, fails to work in the manner intended. 
 
In spite of both a secular decline in income inequality and real growth in the 1990s, 
the armed left-wing political movements remained strong.  It has been difficult to co-opt 
the illegal opposition,
23 especially since the guerrillas have been linked to narco-trafficking 
cartels. These cartels have been able to operate in remote areas with local logistical support 
and protection. Such development has given the guerrilla resources to build an arsenal 
sufficiently strong to allow it to control over half of the municipalities in the country.  
 
At the same time, paramilitary groups are also linked to illegal drug cartels. The 
stock of arms held by the illegal political movements has become their major bargaining 
asset despite their apparent lack of grassroots support. In particular, the power of coercion 
is sufficient to make the guerrilla a political player to be reckoned with.   
 
Over the last decade, the Government’s inability to contain left-wing insurgent 
groups has been such that a tolerant, and some say even sympathetic, blind eye has been 
turned towards illegal paramilitary groups supported by the victims of guerrilla violence. 
The adoption of either military rule or emergency powers as an easy response to violence 
appears to have been successfully addressed by the 1991 Constitution. Colombia has had 
civilian rule, with emergency powers used solely for economic matters, but the cost has 
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open to individual initiatives 
23 Salient exceptions are the peace pact signed by the government with M-19 and the peace process in 1983 
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been the near impossibility to legislate reforms. Courts have been empowered but judges 
have not been provided with the appropriate incentives. In particular, the judiciary has 
curtailed and effectively checked the other branches of government in a populist fashion. 
Concentration of power has been avoided at the cost of stalemate in policymaking.  
 
4.2 The Tension between Congress and the President 
 
It is important to redress the balance of power between the executive and the legislature 
without going so far as the situation of extreme arbitrariness with emergency executive 
powers.  With respect to the operation of the legislature, we suggest, in our seventh 
proposal, that the secrecy of voting in Congress be eliminated as it hampers monitoring by 
voters of their representatives. With regard to the balance of power among the executive 
and the legislature, it is important to devise ways of breaking up gridlock that involve 
neither wholesale collusion as one extreme possibility nor the complete suspension of 
judicial and legislative powers as another.  The latter outcomes lead to complete 
concentration of political power and the shut down of debate.  
 
Currently, the executive can challenge the constitutionality of passed laws through 
the Constitutional Court but it cannot veto laws on the basis of their content going against 
national interest. This reduces the scope for the executive to mitigate the attachment of 
special interest clauses to general laws. To overcome this limitation we propose, in our 
sixth proposal, the provision of agenda setting powers to the executive by making possible 
the passage of urgent legislation, without additions or modifications, through a fast-track 
procedure. This can limit the extent to which members of Congress force the executive 
into negotiations that result in the introduction of clientelistic clauses in unrelated laws. 
 
Our proposal raises a big question: how much agenda-setting and amendment 
power remains in the legislature?  Our recommendations are in line with changes elsewhere 
in the last half of the twentieth century.  There is some trend toward reinforcing executive 
powers through “fast track” procedures in the United States.  The French system goes 
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much further in this respect.  At the same time, there may be a valuable “check” in the 
substantial oversight and investigative powers given to the legislature in the United States. 
   
Although both the French and US systems have substantial executive powers in 
comparison to pure parliamentary systems, they provide for voter balancing of the 
president through the creation of divided government or cohabitation.  Persson and Tabellini 
(1999) show that this type of balancing in presidential systems tends to lead to smaller 
government with both less political rents and less redistribution than in presidential 
systems.  Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, 2000) show that divided government yields less 
polarized policies than the type of one party rule typical in pure presidential systems. 
 
A valuable feature of divided government is that it can permit advocacy of 
opposing policy viewpoints and public debate.  If on the other hand, divided government 
simply means a return to non-transparent negotiated settlements, as in the National Front 
era, divided government would not be desirable. Hence, political competition is a condition 
sine qua non for the separation of powers to induce less polarization and more political 
choice to voters. This requires stronger political parties and fewer candidates.  Our 
proposals 8 and 9 push in this direction. 
 
5. The Three Branches of Government 
 
In this section, we discuss the three branches of government and provide details that 
support our main policy proposals. In addition, we discuss other areas where change would 
be desirable. While the separation of power is desirable, the division of power may be a 
necessary complement. The separation of power stipulates that the different branches of 
government be controlled by different agents. However, these agents may represent narrow 
interests if they all belong to the same party. Indeed, this is a likely outcome in democracies 
with limited political competition.  
5.1 Executive 
 
 
In Colombia, there has been a move from traditional bureaucracies to modern 
technocracies. But some question whether this development has been accompanied by a Checks & Balances  Page 20  09/09/00 
sufficiently widespread rise in meritocracy.  In particular, the cabinet is increasingly 
composed of professionals trained abroad.  The presence of “technocrats” in the cabinet is 
a positive development but barriers to entry to the less well-off segments of the population 
are worrisome. A more equal distribution of opportunities for human capital accumulation 
and alternative modes of recruitment could give greater representation in the cabinet to 
individuals who have previously had substantial experience in elective office. This 
philosophy can be captured by the phrase: “all politics are local”.  This reflects a need to 
build policy consensus as much from the grassroots up as from the top down. Therefore, 
technocratic trends in the executive should be viewed cautiously.
24 Certainly, apart from the 
cabinet itself, government officials should be rooted locally.  This is done, for example, in 
the United States with the regional Federal Reserve banks and with appointments of federal 
district judges, bankruptcy judges, appeals court judges, and district attorneys from local or 
regional bars. 
 
The executive has historically had problems of corruption and misgovernance. A 
recent attempt was made by the executive to introduce reforms to limit the scope for 
corruption in public office. The proposed measures in the Reform of the State package of 
1999 aimed to incorporate transparency and accountability in the public management of 
resources.  This legislative initiative was blocked in Congress, with the endorsement of the 
Constitutional Court.  Also, special powers had been granted to the Executive to draft laws 
in this direction but their constitutionality has been called into question. This is another 
instance of recent rulings by the Constitutional Court, which have overturned Executive 
policy as unconstitutional. We could interpret this as a backlash against the historically 
observed unfettered self-attribution of special prerogatives by newly elected presidents. 
 
5.2 Legislature 
 
The Congress is bicameral with senators elected in a nationwide ballot and representatives 
to the Chamber elected in multi-member districts, both for four-year terms.  In addition, 
the largest remainder system is used as the method of proportional representation.  The 
system as a whole permits the election of members who have either narrow geographic 
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bases, in the case of the Chamber, or narrow special interest bases, in the case of the Senate 
and the Chamber as well.   This may mean that you get the adverse “pork barrel” 
consequences of local politics without the positive “grassroots” connotations.  In this sense 
our proposals are for changes that would improve the representation function of the 
legislature. 
 
There are many possible reforms to consider which would make the interaction 
between the Executive and the Legislature more productive.  First, although we favour 
stronger agenda control powers for the president, it would be desirable to increase the 
oversight and information gathering capacity of the legislature in a way that permits the 
legislature to make constructive recommendations on legislation.   
 
Second, with regard to the general theme of corruption, legislators should be 
insulated from illegal influences through campaign finance reform.  Third, there should be 
a reduction in the size of the Senate, which is the largest upper house in the Western 
hemisphere (Culver, 1999, p.14).  Large legislatures have been seen as simply a source of 
employment for party apparatchiks (see Culver, 1999, p. 6).
25  There should be a check in 
the form of a strong status quo bias against tinkering with the size of the legislature and the 
electoral system.
26  This point is of particular importance given the extensive degree of 
corruption that has been documented to be taking place since the 1990’s in both the Senate 
and the Chamber of Representatives. Fourth, provision should be made to limit the 
expansion of the Chamber of Representatives rather than, as in the current Constitution, 
allowing for expansion with population increases. 
 
Recent episodes show the benefits of improving the oversight role of the legislature 
could extend to dealing with corruption as well as to improving the quality of legislation. 
With regard to the scandal for misuse of funds in Congress this year the Attorney General, 
Mr. Alfonso Gomez, has said on March 25
th 2000 that “in general, there are three types of 
responsibility: disciplinary, penal and political. Oftentimes it is more important to enforce 
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political rather than penal responsibility. It is the lack of political control that facilitates corruption 
because timely political control can avoid dozens of penal processes.” 
 
  This sounds like an argument to improve self-policing in the legislature. It is 
indeed remarkable that it was President Andres Pastrana himself who had to call for 
resignations at the top of Congress, rather than fellow legislators. Given the overwhelming 
evidence, the legislators had to bow to the executive. It is perhaps even more remarkable 
that when the threat of recall of the whole Congress became likely, Congress fulfilled its 
oversight role and alleged inappropriate conduct by senior cabinet members, who have 
since resigned. 
 
    After the majority support in Congress was lost, the executive questioned the 
integrity of the whole Congress on the grounds of corruption at the top, and in particular 
proposed to revoke the terms of all members of Congress. In response, Congress fended 
off such prospect by proposing that the President’s term be revoked on exactly the same 
grounds. This indicates that the problem of impunity may be partly driven by lack of 
incentives to bring out information about corruption rather than lack of efficiency in the 
part of those who should find such information, in particular the legislature and the 
Comptroller General of the Republic. Our proposal 4, limiting the scope for concessions to 
the legislature for the executive to pass laws, should enhance mutual control by the 
branches of government. 
5.3 Judiciary 
 
The introduction of the Constitutional Court in 1991 has triggered a long struggle within 
the judiciary against both the highest criminal court and administrative court, namely the 
Supreme Court and the Council of State. Since 1992, the Constitutional court has repealed 
many rulings by the other high courts. One of the roles of this Court is to identify covert 
collusion among the executive and legislative branches, or constitutional mistakes, in the 
process of law enactment. Unfortunately, Colombia appears to have a problem from 
activist courts that intervene too frequently.  This is in fact part of a trend throughout the 
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world where courts are becoming more independent and intervening to oppose 
government policies. 
 
Activist courts may make decisions that do not reflect widespread consensus and 
thereby engender long-standing conflict.
27  Activist courts also encourage the use of 
lawsuits to produce policy changes that groups cannot accomplish via the usual legislative 
process.  There is a trade-off between activism to protect minority rights but going against 
majority opinion.  One negative consequence of activism is an increase in uncertainty, 
which, in turn, acts as a disincentive to investment.  Sometimes the courts should have 
purely negative impacts on government policy, thus leading to more status quo bias. Other 
times they should actively legislate, as has been the case in the United States occasionally.   
 
In the case of Colombia, activism seems to have gone out of bounds in the sense 
that while the overall justice system is in a precarious state, resources are being devoted to 
overturn economic policies on dubious constitutional grounds.  The judiciary should be 
more active in enforcing existing laws on crime and corruption and less active in the 
lawmaking process. 
 
Activism in the judiciary in Colombia stems from the way in which the higher 
courts are organized and the manner in which the magistrates are chosen. Indeed, 
magistrates have very much the same incentives as politicians. The magistrates are selected 
by peers and by the executive for relatively short periods of eight years and without the 
possibility of re-election. For one year before being selected as a magistrate an individual 
cannot be a judge. This limits the scope for the members of the higher court to be chosen 
in the context of their career progression.  Potential candidates have to find activities and 
means of support during the period before the executive, the Council of State, or the 
Supreme Court selects them. Also, after having served in the higher courts, while they 
cannot be reappointed, magistrates can hold public office after one year.  The short span of 
career of a high court judge could make them prone to render populist, or even myopic, 
decisions. Moreover, the populist character of the judiciary may be reinforced by the self-
recruitment in the selection of magistrates for higher courts. Checks & Balances  Page 24  09/09/00 
 
The way in which the Constitution is written indeed gives the Constitutional Court 
ample leeway to interpret laws. The diversity in the elected Constitutional Assembly that 
drafted the 1991 Constitution did not lead to an agreement on rules and procedures with 
the view that lawmaking would reflect the preferences of citizens without infringing upon 
the rights of minorities. Indeed, the Assembly failed to agree on general principles to 
facilitate political and economic decision-making. Instead of resolving differences, all sorts 
of interests were protected in hundreds of articles, which made unrealistic promises to all 
groups in society. This means that any law can be challenged as unconstitutional by some 
group that loses out.  It is up to the Constitutional Court to decide which of the thousands 
of complaints it processes. But as the actions of individual magistrates are in the public 
domain, incentives are clearly biased towards populist decisions as a magistrate’s term nears 
its end. 
 
In terms of the structure of the higher courts, the main changes require 
constitutional amendments. A couple of modifications that do not require changes of the 
constitution relate to the number of members of the Constitutional Court as well as the 
nature of the majority required. Law sets the number of magistrates. Lowering this number 
may induce status quo bias in the sense that, given the odd number of magistrates, a 
majority for a decision would require a higher proportion of supporters in the Court. Also, 
this would generate a concentration of power within the Court. Another way to limit the 
influence of the Constitutional Court in getting overly involved in influencing the 
lawmaking process is to require supermajorities in declaring laws unconstitutional, as we 
recommend in proposal 2. In this case, support for a decision would also require a higher 
proportion of supporters than before. 
 
The main changes to the judiciary that would enhance the operation of checks and 
balances involve constitutional amendments. Article 233 of the Constitution stipulates that 
the members of the Constitutional Court be chosen, for a fixed eight year term without re-
election, by the Senate on the basis of lists of three candidates provided respectively by the 
executive, the Supreme Court and the Council of State. The myopia that this induces 
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distorts the magistrates’ decision-making adversely. In particular, at the end of their 
relatively short-term there will arise a clear populist bias given that a political career is a 
likely prospect for magistrates. We propose that the term in Court be lengthened. The 
actions of judges partly reflect relatively short horizons induced by 8-year non-renewable 
terms. Longer terms would be desirable, and indeed we recommend life appointments in 
proposal 3. If the term were to remain fixed for some reason, one possibility is to allow for 
magistrates to serve more than one period.  
 
Another source of inefficiency in the judiciary is the lack of a hierarchical structure 
among the higher courts as well an ambiguous division of labour among them. It should be 
well established which is the highest court in the land. The Constitution says that the 
Council of State may rule on some constitutional matters but it does not spell out which. 
Also, there is no explicit rule to resolve conflict in the decisions of the various higher 
courts. In principle, the Council of State should deal with administrative law and the 
Supreme Court with civil law matters. This is a valid division of tasks. But, it would be 
desirable to have a hierarchy among the courts that induces a clear process, as we 
recommend in proposal 1. At present any citizen can challenge laws on the basis of 
constitutionality and the court can choose to look at any complaint.  Hence, any law can be 
challenged immediately and overturned if the majority of magistrates deem it 
unconstitutional.  A process would be desirable in which the Constitutional Court is the 
last instance of decision-making within the judiciary. 
 
One role for the courts is to check the executive—for arbitrary or capricious 
actions, for example—or the legislature—for unconstitutional legislation, for example.   
Another role, much more debatable, is for the courts to be a balance and to assume a 
legislative role when legislatures fail to act.
28  Legislatures, of course, can check the courts 
by passing legislation, which overrides court actions. Again, we need to think about 
appropriate hurdles. If we consider the possibility of strategic behaviour by the judiciary, 
the picture gets substantially more complex. We want for each branch to control the others 
without degenerating into a tit-for-tat game.  This has happened recently not only among 
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28  One particularly distressing example of this relates to the Constitutional Court’s attempt to dictate 
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branches of government but also within the judiciary. For example, as already pointed out 
between the Constitutional Court and the other high courts there has been some gridlock 
in decision-making. Beyond the separation of power among branches clearer decision 
processes within branches are needed. The manipulation of ambiguity in administrative 
procedures can have very adverse consequences (McCubbins et al., 1987; Spiller, 1990). 
Our proposals aim to limit the adverse consequences of strategic behaviour by judges 
through the elimination of short-termism and the introduction of a clear hierarchy among 
courts. 
 
We also recommend in proposal 5 the creation of new specialized courts for 
economic matters, such as tax courts and bankruptcy courts, with judges who have 
received professional training in the relevant areas. Expertise in lower courts might reduce 
deleterious interference by the high courts, which may assume a populist political stance 
having very adverse effects on incentives.
29 
 
6. Elections and the Concentration of Political Power   
In any liberal democracy elections are one of the most important discipline devices for 
voters to avoid abuse of power by policymakers. Checks and balances cannot be conceived 
in isolation of electoral institutions. In this section, we discuss direct democracy and 
electoral competition as ways of controlling politicians. Political competition provides 
further incentives for politicians to look out for the welfare of the citizenry and limit 
personal ambitions.  
Generally we should view the separation of powers and electoral competition as 
complements rather than substitutes. In Colombia, during the period of the National 
Front, collusion induced de facto concentration of political power although different agents 
performed separate governmental functions were. Persson and Tabellini (1999) show that 
majoritarian, rather than proportional, elections increase competition among parties by 
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focusing into key marginal districts. The outcome yields fewer rents to politicians but more 
redistribution and larger government. 
 
 
6.1 Direct Democracy: Referendum, Initiative, and Recall 
 
 
Direct democracy, in addition to elections, represents an important means to check and 
balance the branches of government. Referendum is typically used to designate an 
institution where the government seeks popular approval for a particular policy or 
constitutional change.  Initiative designates popular democracy on demand, where a vote 
occurs on the initiative of private citizens.  Recall is an initiative used to remove an elected 
or appointed official, including judges, from office. 
 
There are pros and cons on all three forms and wide variance in which they are 
used throughout the world.  For example, Italy permits initiative to repeal laws but not to 
pass new laws. The motivation for referendum is that it allows governments to legitimate 
contested policies or to “pass the buck” to the voters. The motivation for initiative is to 
check special interest influence on government. Colombia allows for some direct initiative 
in presenting bills to the Congress, but this is different from allowing the voters to “go 
over the heads” of the legislature. 
 
Some forms of direct democracy might make particular sense for Colombia if one 
accepts the claim that the government is too responsive to a relatively narrow constituency.  
How direct democracy works is very dependent on the details. For example, the number of 
signatures that are required for an initiative is a crucial variable in determining the 
performance of this mechanism. Also, it is of importance whether separate elections are 
held or whether such issues voted on during general elections. 
 
While details merit careful attention, Colombia, given the poor results from its 
current institutions, might do well to make more use of direct democracy institutions that 
are in fact widely used in other nations.  National referenda are used frequently in Europe.  
Although there is no provision for direct democracy in the US constitution because it was a 
deliberately elitist 18
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state level in the United States with the Progressive Movement at the end of the 19
th 
century.  In Switzerland, almost all political decisions are taken by referendum, and major 
changes require not just a majority of the voters but also a majority of the cantons. This 
form of a “double majority” might be a way to give some guarantees groups that have 
regional support and other groups, such as FARC, to seek stronger grassroots support. 
 
6.2 Political Competition 
 
Political competition itself may be the most important check in a political system.  The 
standard prescription of economists is for a political system that enforces the rule of law, 
maintains property rights, limits government intervention in the functioning of markets, 
and has economic policy-making, particularly with regard to central banks, that is 
“independent” of political influence. We need to specify in this framework the relevance of 
the principle: one citizen, one vote. 
 
We would argue that political competition is essential in several respects.  First, it 
may solve agency problems and reduce rent seeking and corruption that would be present 
in an unchecked political, even if technocratic, monopoly.  Second, weighting citizens 
equally rather than by wealth creates advocacy for redistribution.  Some redistributive 
policies may promote growth. Such policies would include investment in education that 
increases human capital formation among children from poor families, investment in health 
and nutrition for the same purpose, and bankruptcy policies that allow for fresh starts from 
economic failures.  Third, when there are redistributive excesses, political competition 
creates advocacy for reforms that increase economic incentives. Colombia may need 
reforms to foster political competition.   
 
Several facts hint that political competition is lacking. First, since the end of the 
military dictatorship in 1958, the Liberals have held the presidency for all but 14 years, and 
the Liberals now hold twice as many seats as the Conservatives in both houses of 
Congress. Second, as indicated earlier, there appears to be a strong element of family 
heredity in the presidency.  More broadly, there should be a removal of barriers to entry in Checks & Balances  Page 29  09/09/00 
political competition. Finally, many observers have noted a narrowing of policy differences 
between the two major parties.   
 
There are therefore some open questions. Is there a redistributive conflict?  Is there 
adequate advocacy? A negative answer to these questions indicates that the entire system 
may lack legitimacy. In the Colombian context, there is a need to promote political 
competition, not only through checks and balances but other institutions. At the moment, 
the political institutions distribute power among governmental branches enabling mutual 
veto and engendering stalemate. The inefficiency of the policymaking process has produced 
apathy and mistrust towards Colombian politics. In particular, the objectives of monitoring 
and advocacy must be fostered in a way that, rather than degenerating into violence, 
aggregates conflict into consensus on long run policies. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have documented a need for the political system in Colombia to become both more 
competitive and more balanced.  The competition should take place between broadly based 
coalitions rather than politicians with narrow clienteles.  A more competitive system will 
probably require a broadening of governmental representativeness.  At the same time, the 
judiciary needs to redirect its emphasis from the populist rejection of government 
proposals on misguided norms of equality or equity, with short-run benefits for the 
disadvantaged but inflicting long-run damage, to the enforcement of legislation dealing 
with crime and corruption. 
 
  Colombia, of course, has major problems connected to violence, guerrilla 
insurgency, and military-civilian relations.  Those problems are outside the purview of this 
chapter, but they impact on the functioning of institutions.  For example, the threat of 
violence has led to secret voting in Congress and also has affected the functioning of the 
judiciary. More generally, the severe deterioration of law and order has fed back into 
institutional paralysis and has served to reinforce negative trends in relationships among the 
branches of government. 
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In the executive-legislative interaction, we observe a pattern that swings back and 
forth between extremely close cooperation and complete gridlock, with attempts by the 
executive to invoke extra-constitutional powers.  With respect to the role of the judiciary in 
providing checks and balances, the presence of the Constitutional Court since 1991 has 
reduced the scope for potential covert collusion in law making and for the declaration of 
states of emergency by the executive.  On the other hand, the Court has introduced very 
costly distortions by intervening in the legislative process.  This is due to the incentives and 
feasibility for the magistrates to make populist decisions. 
  
Nonetheless, even with a background of widespread violence, we believe that 
Colombia can benefit from institutional change.  The most important changes concern the 
judicial system. A clear hierarchy of decision-making needs to be established, including 
courts specializing in economic matters. Judges need to be made independent by receiving 
lifetime tenure. At the same time, the judiciary needs to be checked by making 
appointments independent of the judicial system. Finally, the tendency of the courts to 
almost automatically override the executive and the legislature needs to be checked by 
requiring a supermajority of court judges to reject legislation. 
 
  Other essential changes concern the legislature. On most matters, secret voting 
should be eliminated. Clientelism needs to be curbed by reducing the size of the legislature 
and by changes to the electoral system of largest remainder in multi-representative districts. 
But, these reforms require constitutional changes. Clientelism can also be limited by giving 
the executive fast-track powers to make unamendable proposals. Although it may seem 
paradoxical to advocate further executive powers as a way to enhance checks and balances, 
it is appropriate given that Congress can bring the legislative process to a stalemate by 
demanding pork barrel amendments. Fast-track reduces the scope for this kind of 
opportunistic bargaining by forcing Congress to vote on the issue raised by the executive’s 
legislative initiative. If there is opposition on grounds of national interest, the legislature 
always has the power to build coalitions and put up alternative proposals for vote. Finally, 
the legislature, and the executive, could be checked by popular initiative. 
 
  While well intentioned, the Constitution of 1991 has left Colombia with a 
diminished capacity to govern in a manner that promotes economic efficiency and growth. Checks & Balances  Page 31  09/09/00 
In particular, institutional checks and balances are inadequate. Constitutional provisions 
that attempt to entrench unfeasible economic and social outcomes have resulted in 
distortionary rulings by the judiciary, which have significantly diminished the policymaking 
and lawmaking capacities of the other branches of government. Institutional stability is 
attainable if the political process is empowered and structured to maximize its 
representativeness of the electorate. The separation, and division, of powers is a prominent 
feature of the political system in modern liberal democracies, which has the potential to 
promote lawmaking aligned with the national interest, as long as independent courts and 
political competition prevail. In the present crisis, the changes we have recommended merit 
serious consideration. Checks & Balances  Page 32  09/09/00 
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9. Appendix 
 
Reform Proposals: 
1.  Establish a clear hierarchy of decision-making across the three systems of courts 
(Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and Council of State) such that decisions 
may be appealed upwards in the hierarchy and such that decisions of a higher 
court in the hierarchy are binding on courts lower in the hierarchy. 
2.  For the Constitutional Court to overturn a law passed with the agreement of the 
President and Congress should require a supermajority vote of 7 of the 9 
members. 
3.  Modify article 253 of the Constitution to make members of the Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court, and the Council of State life appointees.  
4.  Modify articles 231 and 239 to have judges in the high courts nominated by the 
executive and confirmed by the Senate.  In article 240, eliminate the prohibition 
of holding another high court judgeship within one year of appointment to the 
Constitutional Court. 
5.  Within the court hierarchy, create specialized courts for economic matters, such 
as taxation and bankruptcy. 
6.  Modify articles 154 and 163 to give the president “fast-track” powers to submit 
unamendable propositions for urgent matters of economic policy to the Congress. 
7.  Eliminate secret voting in both Congress and the three high courts except on 
matters relating to organized crime. 
8.  Revise Article 171 such that the size of the Senate is reduced from 102 to 51 
members. 
9.  Revise Article 176 such that the size of the Chamber of Representatives does not 
increase from its present size of 165 
10. Private citizens collecting signatures of 5% of the electorate can initiate national 
referenda on legislation and constitutional changes. (At present, article 375 
allows citizens only to propose changes to Congress). 